Firm-oriented policies, tax cheating and perverse outcomes by Francesco Busato et al.
 
Department of Economic Studies 
University of Naples “Parthenope” 










Title Firm-oriented policies, tax cheating and 




Author Francesco Busato, Bruno Chiarini, 
















 Firm-oriented policies, tax cheating and perverse outcomes∗




This paper examines the implications of ﬁrm-oriented ﬁscal policies, namely invest-
ment subsidies and tax allowances, in an economy where producers may potentially
avoid taxes. Among our results we stress the following. First, although investment
subsidies induce increased capital accumulation (a level eﬀect), they promote tax eva-
sion; these subsidies induce ﬁrms to increase actual capital accumulation (a level eﬀect),
but also produce a reduction in the share of aggregate capital stock deployed in taxed,
"oﬃcial" production (a composition eﬀect). Second, parameters characterizing the tax-
enforcement system play a major role in explaining tax evasion and ﬁrm size. Third, the
technology structure matters for determining how to allocate resources between oﬃcial
and unoﬃcial production.
Keywords: State aid, tax exemptions, investment subsidies, tax evasion, unoﬃcial /
underground production, investment.
JEL classiﬁcation: E26, E22, H25, H26.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper examines the impact of ﬁscal policies aimed to support ﬁrms, in particular
investment subsidies and tax allowances, on tax evasion and underground production.
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1Subsidy programmes and tax advantages for ”infant” industries or depressed areas are
often justiﬁed because the industry is not competitive enough and prices do not show full
ﬂexibility. Granting capital subsidies and tax allowances to ﬁrms also has important impli-
cations for underground activities and tax evasion.
Underground activities occur in most countries, and there are signiﬁcant indications
that this phenomenon is widespread and increasing. The estimated average size of the
underground sector, as a percentage of total GDP, in the late 1990s was about 17 percent
in OECD countries (Schneider and Enste, 2002).1
The paper presents an optimal-investment model in which a representative ﬁrm maxi-
mizes its expected cash ﬂow, choosing simultaneously an optimal combination of aggregate
capital stock (i.e. ﬁrm size) and its allocation between oﬃcial and unoﬃcial production,
conditional on a set of ﬁscal policy and technological parameters.2
We are not aware of any contribution investigating how ﬁrm-oriented ﬁscal policy af-
fects optimal investment in oﬃcial vs unoﬃcial production. This is a major issue, because
underground activities represent an additional ﬁnancing source for investment, which is not
subject to distortionary taxation. This means that ﬁscal policy results might diﬀer from
what we expect in a model that explicitly incorporates tax evasion.
The model presented in this paper focuses on the moonlighting ﬁrm, by which we mean a
ﬁrm that operates simultaneously in the oﬃcial and unoﬃcial sectors, using the same stock
of capital while evading taxation for the activities that are undertaken underground. Such
a ﬁrm is able to evade taxation, like ﬁrms that operate only in the underground economy,
but in addition, it can exploit technological/institutional advantages conferred by its above
ground activities.
Our analysis focuses on the Italian economy due to the sizeable underground sector
in Italy, and the high percentage of “moonlighters” which operate in the unoﬃcial sector.3
Furthermore, Italian governments have repeatedly supported ﬁrms with investment subsidies
and tax allowances. We think that the theoretical scheme and its predictions may be applied,
without loss of generality, to other countries.
Our analysis delivers three main results: First, investment subsidies promote tax evasion;
subsidies induce ﬁrms to increase their capital stocks (a level eﬀect), but also produce a
reduction in the share of capital used in oﬃcial activity (a composition eﬀect). An investment
subsidy policy is a non-excludable public good that opens room for free-riding (tax evasion
in other words). In this context the Government is not capable, because of (un-modelled)
monitoring costs, to distinguish between regular and moonlighting ﬁrms. Firms therefore
have an incentive to declare a suﬃc i e n t l ys m a l la m o u n to fr e v e n u et ob ee l i g i b l ef o rt h e
subsidy, while investing relatively more in the underground economy and ”pocketing the tax
wedge”. Second, the tax-enforcement system plays a major role in determining both the
ﬁrm’s size, aﬀecting aggregate capital stock, and tax evasion. The third main result of our
analysis asserts that technology matters (what we call moonlighting eﬀect and Total Factor
Productivity eﬀect, discussed below) for determining how to allocate resources between
oﬃcial and unoﬃcial production, hence the amount of reported revenues.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides some stylized facts and
elaborates the motivation of the paper. Section 3 explains the ﬁrm’s maximization problem
and characterizes the long-run equilibrium. In Section 4 the main results of technology and
2Table 1: Italian ﬁrms by employment and revenues size, 2002
N o .o fE m p l o y e e s N o .o fﬁrms with Revenues:
below Euro 5.16 million above Euro 5.16 million Total Firms
1-9 4,379,107 - 4,379,107
10-19 120,627 7,216 127,843
20-49 33,152 18,521 51,673
above 50 - 22,924 22,924
Total Firms 4,532,887 48,660 4,581,547
policy analysis are reported and discussed. Finally, in Section 5 we make some concluding
remarks.
2 Fiscal Policies and Tax Evasion: Selected Stylized Facts for
Italy
The empirical evidence for Italy shows that the production structure, tax evasion and indus-
trial policies are intertwined. In Italy a large proportion of ﬁrms are very small, as shown
by ﬁscal data (Revenue Agency) reported in Table 1.
In 2002, the amount of Euro 5.16 million of sales represented the threshold, adopted by
the Revenue Agency, to distinguish small and medium-sized ﬁrms (hereinafter SMEs), which
are compelled to ﬁle their tax reports using a procedure called Studi di Settore (Santoro,
2008). In the period 1999-2005 the vast majority of Italian ﬁrms (about 99%) were classiﬁed
as SMEs, and employed fewer than 10 workers. The average size of declared revenues was
considerably below the threshold, amounting to Euro 200,000 in the period considered, which
allowed most of the ﬁrms to adopt a simpliﬁed bookkeeping system (Convenevole, Perinetti,
2008). This raises critical issues in terms of tax evasion, since a recent survey (Di Nicola
and Santoro, 2000) pointed out that tax evasion is very widespread among small ﬁrms and
new ﬁrms, especially those located in the south of Italy. Evidence provided by Ercoli (2005)
suggests the occurrence of a threshold eﬀect, driving ﬁrms to stay small in order to remain
under the legal limit granting the simpliﬁed bookkeeping system. The latter indirectly
enhances the opportunity of successful tax evasion, since it reduces the eﬀectiveness of ﬁscal
controls. Ercoli’s data also suggest that small ﬁrms are mostly involved in tax evasion
through under reporting of revenues, whereas large ﬁrms mainly evade taxes by inﬂating
costs. The share of tax evasion in the sample used by Ercoli (2005) is displayed in Figure
1,c o n ﬁrming that evasion declines with the size of apparent revenues.
Figure 1 also shows that there is large heterogeneity, especially among the smallest
ﬁrms, where evasion ranges between 5 and 45% of apparent revenues; however, most of the
ﬁrms display evasion under 15% of total revenues.4
Concerning the structure of tax evading enterprises, Censis (2005) conﬁr m st h a tm o s to f
them are only partial tax evaders, while ﬁrms completely unknown to ﬁscal authorities are
a residual share, as it is is shown in Table 2.5
Given the external appearance of regularity, nothing prevents these ﬁrms from competing
3Figure 1: Tax evasion (as a share of total revenues, vertical axis) and total revenues (thou-
sands of Euro, horizontal axis) based on ﬁscal audits. Source: Ercoli (2005)
Table 2: Irregular ﬁrms as a percentage of total ﬁrms, main Italian regions, 2005
Irregular Firms North-West North-East Center South Italy
Full tax evasion (1) 5.8 4.9 6.8 16.8 9.7
Under reporting (2) 29.7 31.3 41.7 59.9 43.4
Total Irregular Firms (1+2) 35.5 36.2 48.5 76.7 53.1




















































































































































































































Average Incentive Total Incentives Underground Labour: Industry
Figure 2: Average incentives (red bar, left side axis); total incentives (yellow bar, left side
axis); irregular employment (blue line, right side axis) in Italian regions. Source: Ministero
Attività Produttive (2005) and Istat (2003).
for ﬁscal beneﬁts, such as tax relief policies for investment expenditure or tax allowances.
Actually, evidence about State Aid policies, in Italy as well as in Europe, shows that most
public funding is directed to SMEs.6
While the justiﬁcation for State aid policies has often been discussed, their implications
in contexts characterized by the presence of the unoﬃcial economy are largely neglected.
However, the above-described evidence plausibly envisages interactions between policies to
support ﬁrms and tax evasion. Figure 2 reports investment incentives and numbers of
irregular workers for each of the 20 Italian regions. Casual inspection suggests that there is a
positive correlation between the two measures, which is particularly marked when considering
irregular workers in the industrial sector (the correlation is 0.88).
The most intuitive explanation of the positive correlation between the two indexes is
typically traced back to the common factor of “underdevelopment” (Loayza, 1996; Johnson
et al., 1997). However, in this paper we introduce an additional argument, that is a dishonest
behaviour of ﬁrms operating in areas with large ﬁscal beneﬁts and a large underground
economy, as shown in the following sections.
53 The Model
3.1 Tax Evasion
Empirical evidence suggests that ﬁrms have three environments to cope with. There exist
(possibly large) ﬁrms operating in competitive markets with an eﬃcient technology that
are not involved in ”underground” activities, whereas less eﬃcient ﬁrms face diﬃculty in
competing without under-reporting (moonlighting) or concealing all their revenues (ghost
ﬁrms).7
Participation in the oﬃcial economy confers beneﬁts from several services supplied both
from government and from the ”private” market; however, engagement in the oﬃcial econ-
omy requires tax liabilities. On the other hand, tax evasion is a risky activity and, at least
for the wholly underground ghost ﬁrms, it prevents them from gaining access to beneﬁts
available in the oﬃcial economy.
If we deﬁne total output as Y and oﬃcially (unoﬃcially) produced output as Y R (Y U),
for a given triplet of tax-enforcement parameters (τ,ρ,s), i.e., a proportional income tax rate,
τ,aﬁxed probability of being detected and ﬁned, ρ,a n daﬁxed surcharge s>1 for income
(discovered by the authorities) to be concealed, then the expected after-tax production is:
(1 − τ)Y + τ(1 − ρs)Y U, (1)
where the second term in Eq. 1 stands for the expected return of tax evasion, and is given
by:
½
τ with probability (1 − ρ)
τ − τs with probability ρs > 1
In this economy the two extreme situations of full compliance and total evasion occur,
respectively, when τ =0and, in the case of conﬁscatory taxation, τ =1 . In the former case,
no positive returns arise from tax evasion, as it is clear from Eq. 1, whereas in the latter
situation no positive after-tax returns occur in oﬃcial production.8
More realistically, we are interested in studying the implications of tax evasion and
assume that Condition 1 is fulﬁlled in the remainder of the paper:
Condition 1 0 <τ<1; (1 − ρs) > 0.
This condition ensures that ﬁrms would have an incentive to produce both oﬃcially and
unoﬃcially.9
3.2 The Moonlighting production structure
Tax evasion can be considered a useful strategy to squeeze costs, particularly in the case of
ineﬃcient ﬁrms that might otherwise be pushed out of the market. It is often assumed that
ﬁrms operating in the underground economy are less eﬃcient than regular ones;10 although
this is plausible, we argue that ﬁrms operating simultaneously in the oﬃcial and unoﬃcial
sectors might overcome some of the shortcomings of fully underground production.
6The empirical evidence previously presented suggests that there could be some advan-
tages for ineﬃcient ﬁr m st os t a yp a r t l yi nt h eo ﬃcial economy, and paying low taxes, rather
than being completely ghost.
In our setting, the ﬁrm optimal size, K, is determined by understating the true value
of the tax base (proﬁts), by allocating only a share of total capital, μ, to honestly stated
output. The key element here, compared to the literature on ghost ﬁrms, is that all services
available on the oﬃcial markets produce a ﬂow of revenues which, once obtained by the
”visible” side of the ﬁrm, would be freely available also to support its unoﬃcial activities.
Through appropriate under-reporting, the ﬁrm is able to beneﬁt from participation in the
oﬃcial market: access to credit, banking services; public sector services, such as loans and
capital subsidies; marketing and advertising services; trade marks, and so on.
If we assume, as is plausible, that most of the services arising from the oﬃcial market
participation are proportional to ﬁrm size, we can model an external eﬀect generated by
underreporting, and not exploitable by wholly underground, "ghost" ﬁrms, which we call the
moonlighting eﬀect. The latter, in a simpliﬁed framework with a single input of production,
can be modelled as a total capital externality, allowing Total Factor Productivity (TFP) to
be endogenous:
YMOONL = B (μK)
a + B0 [(1 − μ)K]
a
B0 = Kaσ.
In the above production function, a is the capital elasticity, B is the exogenous TFP, and B
0
is the endogenous TFP. The quantity of total capital enhances the productivity of unoﬃcial
production; the moonlighting eﬀect acts as trading inside two plants of the same ﬁrm.
Choosing to allocate a share μ of total capital to the oﬃcial economy implies a cost in terms
of taxation, but involves a beneﬁt in terms of an external eﬀect going from the oﬃcial to
the unoﬃcial production, i.e. the allocation of capital to the oﬃcial production, μ>0,i sa n
externality-producing activity.11
This technology can capture diﬀerent models of unoﬃcial production: medium-sized pro-
ductive units, largely regular, with their own brand, which exploit underground production
to gain extra proﬁts; partial decentralization by a regular ﬁrm toward smaller and irregular
productive units referred to as “local underground districts”; small ﬁrms producing largely
underground, which use oﬃcial production as a convenient screen to avoid ﬁscal controls.12
Condition 2 below suggests that the size of the externality should be suﬃciently low as
to ensure that returns to scale are not increasing at the ﬁrm level:
Condition 2 0 <σ<1−a
a .
The restriction on the size of the moonlighting eﬀect σ and, consequently, the exclusion
of any sort of increasing returns of scale, is a necessary assumption to allow the moonlighting
ﬁrm to choose a ﬁnite optimal scale for its capital stock, capturing the positive interaction
between oﬃcial and underground production.13
7When the ﬁrm engages in moonlighting activity, it exchanges a share of the exogenous
TFP (B) for an endogenous one (Kaσ).14 Moreover, for a given stock of capital, the entre-
preneur compares expected proﬁts under total and partial tax evasion, respectively:
(1 − ρτs)(BKa − rK);
(1 − τ)[(μK)
a − rK]+( 1− ρτs)Kaσ (1 − μ)
a Ka
and takes into account that only when using moonlighting technology can he/she apply
for the tax beneﬁt provided when investing, α. The optimal capital allocation involves a
complex scenario of technological (B,a,σ) as well institutional (ρ,τ,s) parameters.15 We
show, in the FOCs in the next sections, how they inﬂuence the ﬁrm’s capital allocation
among the two productions.16
3.3 Value of the Firm
At time zero the ﬁrm is endowed with a given positive amount of capital
¡ ¯ K0
¢
,a n dw i t ha n
intertemporally ﬁxed ﬂow of a non-capital resource (labour, land), which are normalized to
unity.
Each instant a ﬁrm maximizes the intertemporal cash-ﬂow function, choosing how many
r e s o u r c e st oa l l o c a t et oo ﬃcial production, μ, and how much revenue to invest, I. Investing
is a costly process for ﬁrms; the standard assumption here adopted is that the adjustment
costs are a convex function of the rate of change of the capital stock:
C(I)=Ib;b>1.
In addition, we assume that investments are encouraged by the government, which pro-
vides a capital contribution proportional to total investment, α,t oﬁrms which are willing
to increase their capital stock. We assume that government is neither able to know whether
new capital will be employed in oﬃcial or unoﬃcial production, nor has accountability tools
at its disposal enforcing the ﬁrm to declare only the capital oﬃcially employed.17
The value of the ﬁrm is the expected present value of its revenues net of expenditures
on capital input and costs incurred by adjusting its capital input. The representative ﬁrm







s.to : Π =( 1− τ)[B(μK)a − rK]+( 1− ρτs)(1 − μ)aKa(1+σ) − I − Ib + αI (3)
: ˙ K = I − δK (4)
:0≤ μ ≤ 1 (5)








The quantity (1 − τ)[B(μK)a − rK]+( 1− ρτs)(1 − μ)aKa(1+σ) represents the ﬁrm’s
expected revenues, net of taxation, I is the amount of gross investment, and δ is the physical
depreciation rate of capital. The amount αI denotes an investment allowance, where α falls
in the (0,1) interval. Alpha represents several diﬀerent types of State aid, such as grants
to ﬁrms investing in less developed areas (regional aid), loans to small and medium-sized
enterprises (SME aid), and other facilities for speciﬁc sectors (sector aid).
Deﬁning φ0, φ1 and φ2 Lagrange multipliers and the current value Hamiltonian H,
manipulation of the ﬁrst order conditions leads to the following conditions characterizing
optimal capital accumulation and tax evasion:18
[(φ0 − 1+α)/b]
1/(b−1) = I (9)
(1 − τ)aBμa−1Ka − (1 − ρτs)a(1 − μ)a−1Ka(1+σ) =0 (10)




− (1 − ρτs)(1 − μ)aa(1 + σ)Ka(1+σ)−1 (11)
˙ K = I − δK. (12)
Proposition 1 below proves that the model has an interior solution.
Proposition 1 For ﬁrms with moonlighting technology it is not worth either becoming com-
pletely regular (μ =1 )nor turning into a ghost ﬁrm (μ =0 ) : i.e. the model does not admit
corner solutions.
Proof. μ as well as (1 − μ) are the basis of a negative power in Eq. 10, such that to
have a ﬁnite solution they must necessarily lie in the open interval (0,1).
The investment function (Eq. 9) has standard characteristics: for a given level of ﬁscal
allowances, α, investment is increasing in φ0, and gross investment is zero when the marginal
value of capital is just equal to the market price of capital, normalized to 1,n e to fﬁscal
allowance. Fiscal incentives for capital accumulation clearly increase investment.
Eq. 10 ensures the optimal allocation of capital between visible (oﬃcial) and under-
ground (unoﬃcial) production: the marginal eﬀect of a capital reallocation on the net-of-tax
revenues in the two sectors must be equal.
93.4 The Steady State
3.4.1 Qualitative Analysis
Combining the investment function with Eq. 12, we obtain a dynamic system such that
the Steady state (˙ φ0 = ˙ K =0 ) is characterized by the system:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨




























The ﬁrst equation suggests that in equilibrium (i.e. in the long run) the shadow price of
capital is the discounted value of the net-of-tax marginal productivity of capital; the second
condition states that the stock of capital is stable when investment is just equal to physical
depreciation of capital; ﬁnally, the last relation expresses the optimal allocation of the capital
stock between oﬃcial and unoﬃcial production.19 It should be stressed that the long-run
equilibrium can only be described in a three-dimension space, and given the non-linearity
of the involved relationships, we are compelled to use calibrate and simulate the system in
order to describe the nature of the steady state.
Proposition 2 In the long run, the dynamic system pertaining to steady state System 13
admits a unique steady state.
Proof. APPENDIX
Proposition 3 The steady state of the dynamic system pertaining to steady state System
13 is always a saddle path.
Proof. APPENDIX
3.4.2 Model parameterization
The model depends on ﬁve parameters. We calibrate these parameters for Italy, a country
with a large-scale underground production and high tax evasion.20 Moreover, as stressed
earlier in this paper, underground activities are characterized by a high percentage of moon-
lighting ﬁrms — ﬁrms that simultaneously produce oﬃcially and unoﬃcially — and that Gov-
ernments in this political economy have repeatedly supported ﬁrms with capital subsidies
and tax allowances.21
The capital elasticity a, consistent with the calculations of capital’s income share from
the national accounts, is set at the value 0.3; the exogenous cost of capital (the real interest
rate), r, set at 0.025; the rate of physical depreciation of capital, δ, is calibrated to 0.125.
Next, the tax rate, τ, is set at 0.4, which is the average between the IRES (Imposta redditi
società, a sort of proﬁt taxation) and the eﬀective average taxation, as calculated by Chiarini
et al. (2008); the tax surcharge applied to ﬁrms caught evading taxes, s, following Italian
civil law, is set at 1.3. The probability that a ﬁrm is discovered and convicted of tax evasion,
ρ, is set at a very low value, 0.05, to give an idea of low enforcement, which intuitively
10corresponds to actual conditions in Italy. This is particularly true for small ﬁrms, since,
according to Ercoli (2005), most of the inspections are directed towards large ﬁrms. The
size of the subsidy for capital accumulation, α, is set at 14% in the baseline calibration.22
Finally, we need to specify the two technological parameters B and σ.T h e s ea r ej o i n t l y
calibrated to get an average evasion plausibly consistent with data available for Italy. The
moonlighting eﬀe c tm u s ta l s ob ec o n s i s t e n tw i t hC o n d i t i o n2d e ﬁned above, and with the
model saddle path’s condition, outlined in the Appendix. As the maximum value for this
parameter is 1.6, we set it at an intermediate level of 1, such that the total capital externality
is 0.3. Finally, given data on tax evasion noted in Section 2, a plausible ﬁgure for tax evasion
is 20%; accordingly, we set the exogenous Total Factor Productivity, B, to a value of 10.23
Model Calibration: the benchmark
α B τ σ r ρ s a δ
0.14 10 0.40 1 0.025 0.05 1.3 0.3 0.125
Given this set of parameters, the solution of the dynamic system identiﬁes a single long-
run equilibrium, given by the equilibrium vector:
(K∗ =1 9 ;μ∗ =0 .79),
with a benchmark capital size equal to 19, and a share of aggregate capital deployed in
the oﬃcial production amounting to 79%.
3.4.3 Steady State Relations (K,φ0) and (μ,K)
The three steady state relations expressed by System 13 can be geometrically represented
in the space (K,φ0,μ). In order to provide more insights into the local dynamics around the
steady state, we prefer to represent them in two bi-dimensional graphs as in Figure 3.24
The left-hand panel in the Figure displays the two steady state relations ˙ φ0 =0(the shadow
price of capital) and ˙ K =0(the stock of capital), which are standard in the literature on
optimal investment.
The right-hand panel in Figure 3 represents, in the space (μ,K), the relationship be-
tween the oﬃcial capital share μ and the total stock of capital (K),d e ﬁn e db yt h el a s t
equation of System 13:f o re a c hl e v e lo fK identiﬁed by the solution of System 13,a
unique cash-ﬂow maximizing value of μ is identiﬁed. The locus μ(K) is monotone and de-
creasing: given the nature of the moonlighting eﬀect, the larger the amount of total capital,
t h em o r eb e n e ﬁt is obtained in shifting it to underground production (e.g. μ drops).
The left-hand panel in Figure 3 also displays the local dynamics: the stability arrows
show that there is a single stable arm which leads the ﬁrm toward the long-run equilibrium,
consistent with the standard literature. When the capital stock dimension is lower than the
optimal level, given Eq. 10,t h eo ﬃcial capital share, μ, is higher than optimal (see also
the right-hand panel in Figure 3); during the process of capital accumulation, the ﬁrm also
shifts capital into underground technology (i.e. μ drops). This allocating process lasts until
the marginal productivity is equal across sectors (oﬃcial and unoﬃcial sectors, see. Eq.
10). An analogous symmetric process applies when the capital dimension is higher than the
optimal level and the ﬁrm operates on the lower and right-hand side of the stable arm.25























Figure 3: Points above the locus ˙ φ0 =0are characterized, for each level of K,b yaφ0 higher
than the equilibrium level; given the dynamic expressed in Eq. 11 it implies a growth in
the shadow price of capital (arrows pointing up). Similarly, when considering points above
˙ K =0 , we register for each K a φ0 higher than the equilibrium level; given the investment
function, Eq. 9, and the dynamic expressed in Eq. 12, it implies a growth of capital stock
(arrows pointing right).
3.4.4 The Exogenous TFP eﬀect
Parameter B is the exogenous component of the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) in moon-
lighting technology, and it produces important implications for the relationship between ﬁrm
size and underground activity.
Changes in this technological parameter generate considerable diﬀerences with the base-
line calibration, both in terms of optimal capital dimension and oﬃcial capital share. In
Figure 4 we show the pattern of steady state capital size and its oﬃcial allocation, cal-
culated by solving System 13, for a set of possible parametrizations of the exogenous TFP.
Precisely, we get the pattern of the steady state capital size (as well as μ) changing B in the
interval (0,100), keeping unaltered all the remaining parameters at their benchmark.
As long as the exogenous TFP rises, there is a corresponding increase in capital stock, i.e.
ﬁrm size. On the other hand, a larger TFP also implies that capital is increasingly allocated
in the honestly stated production, i.e. μ rises, and the pattern displayed in the right-hand
panel of Figure 4 shows a convex relationship, slowly approaching unity as TFP tends to
become very large.
These experiments suggest a strong and direct relationship between the exogenous TFP,
which predicts the degree of eﬃciency of the technology and drives ﬁrm size, and the choice
to operate regularly. This is consistent with the evidence commented upon in the previous
section, and with the literature, that is almost unanimous on the importance of ﬁrm size in
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Figure 4: The eﬀect of exogenous TFP (B) on optimal capital stock (K*) and oﬃcial capital
share (μ*).
aﬀecting the propensity to operate in the underground economy.
Two further points are worth emphasizing before proceeding. First, the model states that
f o rs m a l la n dp o o r l ye ﬃcient ﬁrms it is worth declaring some of their revenues, i.e. μ is always
above zero, but the visible production is considerably lower than total production. Secondly,
as long as TFP and ﬁrm size rise, the share of capital allocated to oﬃcial production tend
to one: a process of technological growth should be able to promote compliance.
4 Policy Implications
This section presents the eﬀects of selected ﬁscal policy experiments, pertaining to the en-
forcement triplet (τ,ρ,s) and to the subsidy policy (α), on the long-run equilibrium of the
moonlighting ﬁrm (the total capital stock, the oﬃcially deployed capital share, and total
production). Moreover, we consider how diﬀerent values for the technological parameter σ
aﬀect the size of the moonlighting ﬁrm, and the allocation of the total capital stock between
the two productions. Notice that parameter σ can also be broadly considered a policy in-
strument, in the sense that the possibility for the moonlighting ﬁrm to exploit the external
eﬀect of the aggregate capital is supposed to be a function of the institutional and social
framework in which ﬁrms operate.
Useful insights may be drawn from the analysis of the reaction functions, which express
the estimated steady state of total capital, its oﬃcially deployed share and total production
as a function of each single ﬁscal policy parameter. Each graph in the top row of Figure 5
shows, respectively, the eﬀects of a variation in tax rate, capital subsidy, expected penalty
and moonlighting eﬀect on the size of total capital stock, while in the middle and bottom
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Figure 5: reaction of the equilibrium capital stock (K*, top row), equilibrium capital al-
location (μ∗,middle row) and total production (Y ∗, bottom row) to: taxation (column 1);
investment subsidy incentives (column 2); expected penalties for discovered tax evasion (col-
umn 3); moonlighting eﬀect(column 4).
The reaction functions are always monotone, though non-linear; we comment upon each
of the ﬁscal experiments separately in the next subsection.
4.1 Sensitivity Analysis
Starting from the reaction functions to changes in taxation, Figure 5 shows that tax policy
is the only measure able to generate a positive co-movement between the two objective
variables, total capital and oﬃcial capital share. For instance, starting from the baseline
value of taxation, 0.4, a fall in tax rate generates increases in the total capital stock as
well as its oﬃcially deployed share. The tax reduction increases the net-of-tax marginal
revenue of capital; this occurs in more marked fashion in oﬃcially produced output due to
Condition 1.26 The fall in the taxation ratio, (1 − ρτs)/(1 − τ), alters the equilibrium
relationship between K and μ expressed in Eq. 10. Hence, a tax cut (rise), ceteris paribus,
induces the moonlighting ﬁrm to engage in more (less) oﬃcial production.
When considering the second column, i.e. the eﬀect of investment subsidies, the follow-
ing remarks apply. Increasing the size of subsidies to capital accumulation pushes up the
equilibrium level of the capital stock, as we would intuitively expect, but also generates a
14marginal reduction in the oﬃcial capital share. The increase in the incentive to capital ac-
cumulation reduces the cost of capital, such that there is an immediate eﬀect on investment.
The rise of capital stock alters equilibrium marginal productivity (Eq. 10), such that as
long as net investment is positive, the ﬁrm also reallocates capital between the oﬃcial and
unoﬃcial sectors. The important point is that, contrary to the presumption that subsidies
may also be useful for pushing ﬁrms to operate ”overground”, in the presence of moonlight-
ing technology, the incentives to improve capital stock are actually counterproductive in that
they increase the unoﬃcial economy overall.
From the third column of Figure 5 it is possible to infer the impact of a stricter en-
forcement policy, as simulated by a larger value for the product (ρs), i.e. the expected
penalty for discovered underground production. The graph clearly comﬁrms that increasing
the eﬀectiveness of enforcement causes a decline in the share of capital allocated to unoﬃcial
production. However, there is also a negative eﬀect on total capital, as well as total pro-
duction. This evidence, associated to the strong and positive eﬀects of a tax cut, seriously
depreciates the role of enforcement in ﬁghting tax evasion.
Finally, we examine the impact of the external eﬀect, σ. This new technological element
characterizes our ﬁrms, explicitely stating the advantages of operating in the oﬃcial and
unoﬃcial productions. The moonlighting eﬀect, proposed in this paper, shows how the
evader and the regular entrepreneur are ”intertwined”, and how great is the advantage of
operating together through the economy as a result of transparent support of oﬃcial activity
for unoﬃcial production. This insight follows directly from the model and, as stressed above,
it is supported by empirical evidence, emerging from several surveys, on the characteristics
of ﬁrms that operate in the underground sector. Intuitively, a large (small) value for σ
implies that the moonlighting ﬁrm strongly (weakly) beneﬁts from the simultaneity of its
two productions. For instance, a larger value of σ compared to the benchmark (σ =1 )
triggers an investment process and a drop in the oﬃcially deployed share of capital. While σ
approaches the threshold excluding increasing returns of scale, the solution converges toward
ag h o s tﬁrm, i.e. μ → 0, while size is no longer determinate. 27
Two main policy implications are worth stressing when focusing on policies against tax
evasion. First, a trade-oﬀ arises when a stricter penalty is enforced: in this situation, as
shown clearly by the third column of Figure 5,t h er i s ei no ﬃcial capital is associated to a
decline in total production. Secondly, tax evasion, as proxied by the oﬃcial share μ, seems
to display a hard core which is, for plausible ﬁscal policy parameters, around 20%. This
proportion is hardly aﬀected either by a rise in expected penalty and/or by larger capital
subsidies. In the ﬁrst case (plots in column 3), the capital allocation to the apparent/oﬃcial
production ranges from .78 to .88 while the expected penalty rises; in the second case
(column 4), a perverse eﬀect arises.
Conversely, tax evasion is appreciably aﬀected, under the moonlighting technology, by
t h es i z eo ft h ee x t e r n a l i t ye ﬀect, σ, and tax rate, τ. Moreover, though a large externality
implies an oﬃcially deployed share of capital tending to zero, a considerable reduction of the
ﬁscal burden is unable to allocate all the capital to honestly stated activities.
15On the other hand, in evaluating industrial policies, such as state aid, we conclude that
the ﬁscal authorities should be very careful when planning policies to support investment,
especially in areas where the underground economy is sizeable, because of their perverse
eﬀects. Figure 5 shows that capital subsidies have a deep impact on capital accumulation,
but they also produce a reduction in the honest use of capital. In designing policy subsidies
to the stock of capital, what should be taken into account is the “nature” of the ﬁrm, and,
in particular, whether in the sector, and also in the area where the ﬁrm operates, a large
part of output is unreported.
As incentives to investment in the presence of moonlighters always produce incentives to
go underground, it may be argued there is the risk that this policy proves, via underground
activities, to be what is known as a time-inconsistent policy. If government policies support
moonlighting ﬁrms, the latter will not ﬁnd it worth increasing their reported capital, given
that they already enjoy ﬁscal incentives. Moreover, as we showed in section 3, technology
(i.e. the TFP eﬀect) matters for determining the extent of the declared production. Granting
subsidies might have the side-eﬀect of lowering the proﬁtability to invest in TFP enhancing
activities, which are a powerful mechanism to attain more oﬃcial production.28 Therefore,
the government would be forced to subsidize capital accumulation for longer than expected,
without having any considerable impact on tax evasion.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have investigated the eﬀects of selected ﬁscal policies, some of them broadly
included among State aid policies, in a context in which underground production is feasible.
The innovation of the paper is twofold: ﬁrst, we represent a speciﬁc technological advan-
tage (aggregate capital externality) of moonlighting ﬁrms over ghost ﬁrms that we believe
is intuitively plausible and squares with common knowledge. Second, we consider the impli-
cation of this framework for two commonly used modes of ﬁscal policy designed to increase
investment and the capital density of production (and, hence, ultimately labor productivity
and standards of living).
In this regard, we set out an optimal investment model in which a representative ﬁrm
maximizes its expected cash ﬂow, by choosing an optimal combination of capital stock and
its allocation between oﬃcial and unoﬃcial production. The model provides several striking
policy implications.
First consider the troubling aspects of capital subsidies. In the context of moonlighting
ﬁrms, which display a kind of technology that is certainly not purely theoretical, but is
strongly supported by empirical evidence, government ﬁscal support of private investment
spending yields an incentive not only to increased capital accumulation but also to its un-
derground use. This policy is clearly counterproductive if a government also aims to reduce
tax evasion.
The second result concerns the trade-oﬀ related to the tax-enforcement system. Though
tax reduction and strict enforcement both reduce ﬁrms’ incentives to operate underground,
their eﬀects on total production are basically diﬀerent: while a tax reduction is also output
improving, the enforcement policy yelds an output reduction. Thus, a trade-oﬀ arises be-
16tween oﬃcially deployed capital share and ﬁrm size when unoﬃcial production is combatted
through rising expected penalties.
Third, under plausible calibration, there is evidence of a persistence in tax evasion which
cannot be easily reduced under a threshold of about 15% without dramatic policies, such as
very big tax cuts.
This last implication, largely consistent with both micro- and macro-founded evidence
for Italy, suggests that a strategy against tax evasion should be multi-faceted, and strictly
connected with industrial policies. The calibrated model suggests that in order to empower
the oﬃcial economy it is necessary to pursue a mixed strategy, aiming to reduce the ﬁscal
burden, but also to raise ﬁrm eﬃciency. In fact, in our simulation it is crucial to improve the
TFP, since a process of technological growth is very successful to promote oﬃcial production.
17Notes
1Estimates of the underground economy are particularly diﬃcult as the phenomenon is, by deﬁnition, not
directly measurable. Several methods have been used for this purpose, some based on theoretical models,
some based on econometrics and others on micro analysis of agent responses in particular surveys. See,
among others, The Economic Journal (1999) symposium on the Hidden Economy, and Busato, Chiarini and
Di Maro (2006).
2We stress that in this paper tax evasion is related to underground activities, which are otherwise legal
but go unreported or unrecorded.
3In Italy, the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) produces several time series estimates of the under-
ground economy and employment, disaggregated at regional level since 1995. According to ISTAT, under-
ground economy accounted, in 2006, for 17% of total Value Added. Data on tax evasion in Italy are currently
provided by the Revenue Agency of the Ministry of Finance, which has recently estimated a yearly time series
of the non-reported Value Added Tax base. The size of VAT evasion in percentage terms was about 30% in
2004.
4It is worth stressing that this evidence is aﬀected by the sample selection, which is biased toward large-
sized ﬁrms where ﬁscal controls guarantee more cash revenues.
5The survey carried out by Censis (Centre for Social Studies and Policies) is based on qualitative method-
ology, namely interviewing selected witnesses (managers, union representatives, public oﬃcers and so on).
Hibbs and Piculescu (2008), using data from the World Bank, point out that managers of more than 60%
of 3,818 interviewed enterprizes, distributed over 54 countries, are used to operating both in the oﬃcial and
unoﬃcial sector.
6European Union (EU) State aid policy is strictly regulated since it may harm competition. To this end,
the European Commission Treaty (Art. 87) obliges EU governments to negotiate their allowances with the
European Commission. There are several instruments of State aid (see Nitsche and Heidhues, 2006 and
European Commission, 2006). Grants and Tax Exemptions and Equity Participation comprise aid that is
transferred in full to the recipient and accounts for the vast majority of aid in all Member States. Soft Loans
and Tax Deferrals cover transfers in which the aid element is the interest saved by the recipient during the
period in which the capital transferred is at his/her disposal. Guarantees, expressed in nominal amounts
guaranteed, incorporate aid elements corresponding to the beneﬁt which the recipient receives free of charge
or at lower than the market rate.
7See Cowell (1990).
8Solving Eq. 1 to show the separate contribution of the two productions we get:
(1 − τ)Y
R +( 1− ρτs)Y
U.
9In this paper we use a simple tax evasion model. There are many issues, concerning the penalty rate, the
possibility of detection and audit, that we cannot discuss here. See, among others, the survey of Andreoni,
Erald and Feinstein (1998), Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002), Bayer (2006) and Sandmo (2006). Both the
empirical and theoretical literature usually consider taxation and regulation as the main causes of the existence
of the underground sector (see Thomas, 1992; Tanzi, 1980; Dallago,1990). Analysis of tax evasion, starting
from Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974), focuses on the structure of marginal taxation,
and/or the consequences for private/social welfare, without investigating the link between tax evasion and
technology (see Cowell, 1990; Trandel and Snow, 1999, for surveys on tax evasion, and Alm, 1985 for the
welfare eﬀects of evasion). On the other hand, when focusing on the technology of underground activities,
the literature very often concentrates on labour inputs, neglecting capital utilization (see Portes, Castells and
Benton, 1989; Boeri and Garibaldi, 2001; Busato and Chiarini, 2004; Busato, Chiarini and Rey, 2005).
10Typical explanations include lower entrepreneurial ability, diﬃculty in getting ﬁnancial support and high
transaction costs due to the necessity to locate “trustworthy” trading partners. See Anderberg et al. (2003);
Loayza (1994).
11In a diﬀerent framework, Hibbs and Piculescu (2008) allow "B" to denote the productive value of institu-
tional services available only to oﬃcial activity. Here we claim it is more plausible that some of those services
can be used surreptitiously to enhance unoﬃcial production (through the moonlighting eﬀect) without the
enforcement authorities catching on, whereas totally unoﬃcial ( "ghost" ) ﬁrms do not have access to this
proﬁt enhancing externality.
12For greater details for Italy see Lucifora (2003) and Roma (2001).
1813In the appendix it is shown that a suﬃcient condition to allow saddle path stability is: σ<(a − 1)
2 /a <
(1 − a)/a.
14In order to ensure the advantageousness of the moonlighting technology, a suﬃcient condition is that
Y(ghost)<Y(moonl) for a given capital stock, which reads as follows:
K
aσ/B (1 − μ
a) > 1 − μ
a.
This condition holds in all the parametrizations we use to deﬁne the steady state.
15We do not consider the eﬀect of corruption and bribing activities, which are additional costs for ﬁrms
operating in the underground economy. This issue is well addressed in Hibbs and Piculescu (2008).
16Output elasticity is the same in the two productions when considering the share of capital allocated there,
μK and (1 − μ)K, whereas output elasticity of total capital K is larger in unoﬃcial production due to the
moonlighting eﬀect.
17This assumption along with Condition 2 in the main text is a strong incentive toward underground
production. A diﬀerent situation would occur if the ﬁscal authorities were more eﬀective in allowing incentives
to capital than in detecting tax evasion. In this case the rational agent would choose to produce irregularly,
YU > 0, but seek incentives only on the regular share of its investment, αμI. T h i sh y p o t h e s i sc o m p l i c a t e s
the analysis considerably, generating unstable and oscillating equilibria.








19The negative relation expressed by the μ(K) equation in System 13 is a consequence of the endogenous
TFP in underground technology.
20Some insights into the size of the underground economy in EU countries are given in the Flynn Report
(European Commission, 1998), which estimated that unoﬃcial production of goods and services in European
countries ranged between 7 and 16% of total GDP, with considerable diﬀerences among States. The largest
shares of informal activities were recorded in southern countries, in particular Italy and Greece, with a size
of about 20% of GDP, followed by Belgium and Spain, with slightly lower ﬁgures. More recent ﬁgures seem
to conﬁrm this ranking of countries (Schneider and Enste, 2002).
21For the size of the underground economy, see, Baldassarini and Pascarella (2003), Schneider and Enste
(2002), and Busato, Chiarini and Di Maro (2006). An outline of the State aid to ﬁrms in Italy may be found
in Bosco (2002) and Ministero delle Attività Produttive (2005).
22Calibration of the ﬁscal parameters τ and α was chosen starting from the analysis of the Italian ﬁrm ﬁscal
regimes addressed in Bontempi et al. (2001). In particular, incentives to investment identiﬁed as Credito di
Imposta ranges from an average level of 0.14 for the Center-North regions, to 0.65 for the least developed
region (Calabria). As for corporate taxation, Chiarini et al. (2008) investigate the size and dynamics of two
tax rates: the average “apparent” tax rate, where tax revenues are compared with the total GDP (reported
and concealed), and the “eﬀective” tax rate, where tax receipts are compared with the GDP net of a proxy
of the concealed output. Finally, the calibration for the penalty, s, is dicussed in Busato Chiarini (2004).
23We simulate the outcomes for diﬀerent values of B in Section 3.4.4.
24As stated above, we have a non-linear system described in a three-dimensional space. In order to ﬁnd
the steady state characteristics we must calibrate and simulate the system.
25Of course, every path other than the saddle path takes the ﬁrm far from the long-run equilibrium to
areas in which the transversality condition (Eq. 7) no longer applies.
26Given Condition 1 in the main text, a fall in the tax rate necessarily causes, in the steady state solution
(13), a fall in the taxation ratio (1 − ρτs)/(1 − τ).
27Graphically, the locus ˙ K =0would have the usual increasing shape, but we would also observe an
increasing locus ˙ φ0 =0situated above the ˙ K =0such that no equilibrium could be found.
28See, for instance, Tornell’s (1991) analysis for trade policies.
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6A p p e n d i x
Proposition 2 In the long run, the dynamic system pertaining to steady state System 10
admits a unique steady state.






(1 − τ)aB [μ∗ (K)]
a Ka−1 − r(1 − τ)+( 1− ρτs)[1− μ∗ (K)]
a a(1 + σ)Ka(1+σ)−1¤





To show that the ﬁrst equation expresses φ0 as a monotone and decreasing function of
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(1−ρτs)a(1+σ)
r+δ > 0.
The expression derived from equation 7 in the main text:
μ∗(K)= CKd
1+CKd;d = aσ













2 < 0 ∀a<1
It implies that the ﬁrst term of
dφ0(K)
dK is always negative, such that we need to demonstrate
that the second one is negative too:
[a(1 + σ) − 1][1 − μ∗ (K)]
a Ka(1+σ)−2 − a[1 − μ∗ (K)]
a−1 Ka(1+σ)−1μ∗ (K)
0 < 0
Using again the deﬁnition of μ∗(K) as well as
dμ∗(K)
dK we get:


















Ka(1+σ)−2 − aKa(1+σ)−2 CdKd
[1+CKd]
a+1 < 0








[a(1 + σ) − 1] − a CdKd
[1+CKd] < 0
[a(1 + σ) − 1] − adμ < 0.
As μ is a majorant of this last expression, we consider the case μ =1to get:
σ<(a − 1)
2 /a < (1 − a)/a
This condition can be considered a suﬃcient condition to obtain the required monotony
of the relation ˙ φ0 =0 .
23Second Step
The second equation expresses φ0 a monotone and increasing function of the stock of
capital K. Indeed,
dφ0
dK = b(b − 1)(δK)
b−2 > 0 for each b>1.
Given that the codomain of the ﬁrst equation is (0;+∞) while the second equation has
codomain (1 − α;+∞), it follows that there exists a single value of K such that the two
equations simultaneously apply.
Proposition 3 The steady state of the dynamic system pertaining to steady state System
10 is always a saddle path.
Proof. The dynamic system related to the steady state System 10 can be written as
follows: ½ ˙ φ0 =( r + δ)φ0 − (1 − τ)aB (μ∗)
a Ka−1 + r(1 − τ) − (1 − ρτs)[1− μ∗]
a a(1 + σ)Ka(1+σ)−1
˙ K = I (φ0) − δK
The Jacobian of this System of Equations evaluated at the steady state is:
∙
r + δ −∂2Π/∂2K
∂I/∂φ0 −δ
¸
and it has a trace and a determinant given by:








(1 − τ)aB (μ∗)
a Ka−1 +( 1− ρτs)(1 − μ∗)aa(1 + σ)Ka(1+σ)−1¤
/dK
Local stability, and in particular saddle path stability, requires that the trace should
be positive, while the determinant should be negative, when evaluated at the steady state.
Under our parametrization it implies that the condition ∂2Π/∂2K<0, which is the necessary
condition to get a concave objective function, is also a suﬃcient condition to get saddle path
stability. Given the demonstration of the ﬁrst step of Proposition 2, it follows that
∂2Π/∂2K<0.
This result implies that the Determinant of Jacobian matrix of linearized System 10 is
negative, and it underlines that the equilibrium is a saddle path.
24